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ABSTRACT
This article introduces a new instrument in the context of hedge fund seeding,
which we call fees-for-guarantee swap, with the aim of alleviating the early-stage
funds (ESF) managers’ financial constraint caused by severe asymmetric information
between investors and managers. The swap plays a role in enhancing the ESFs
manager’s credibility by swapping part of her fees for an insurance on the behalf
of seeding investors, whom would be fully refunded once the fund defaults. We
set up a dynamic continuous-time framework within which closed-form prices for
seed capital, guarantee costs and other claims have been derived. Our numerical
findings indicate that incentive compensations, managerial ownership and hedge
funds liquidation risks not only inhibit ESFs managers’ risk-shifting incentive but
align interests among ESFs manager, seeder and insurer as well.
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1. Introduction
Over the past few years, there has been a significant increase in both the number
of hedge fund seeders and the amount of capital available for hedge fund seeding.
According to HFM-Week research, in November 2011, seeders had approximately $4.6
billion in available capital, compared to approximately $1 billion just one year earlier.
Despite the recent growth in available seed capital, there still remains a tremendous
shortage of capital for the early-stage funds (ESFs, henceforth). This is because most
capital allocators increasingly focus on larger established hedge funds considered highly
credible, on one hand, and a larger talent pool of ESFs managers is now competing
for the available seed capital, on the other hand. Moreover, barriers to entry for ESFs
are much steeper today than that before the 2008’s financial crisis.1 Thus financial
constraint faced by ESFs managers nowadays is much more serious than before.
Normally in a hedge fund seeding business deal, a seed investor or seeder commits
to providing a remarkable amount of capital as an “anchor investor” in a new fund in
CONTACT Hai Zhang. Email: hai.zhang@strath.ac.uk
1Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act compels the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to impose reporting requirements on all hedge funds as it deems necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the assessment of systemic risk. The article, “Launch bad; Hedge funds”,
published in The Economist 20 Apr. 2013: 79 (US) states that it is much harder to break into the hedge-fund
world than before, because of the rising expenses, more risk-averse investors and enhanced regulation.
exchange for a share of “enhanced economics” which is usually the fees that the ESFs
manager generates from the entire pool of assets in the fund. 2 A widely accepted rule
of thumb is for a seeder to expect 1% of revenues for each $1 million of seed capital
provided for seed transactions no larger than $50 million. However, it would not be
surprising to see a 25% revenue share on a seed investment of US $100 million as seed
arrangements can vary substantially based on factors such as managerial experience
or alpha strategy, the amount of seed capital provided, and relative negotiating power
of each party. If fees-for-seed swap has been structured properly, the seeding vehicle
could be highly beneficial to both ESFs managers and seeders.3
Although fees-for-seed swaps in reality has, to some extent, solved ESFs managers’
financial constraint, there still remains a huge gap between the highly demanded seed-
ing capital and the limited supply at the hedge fund seeding stage. And the borne
severe information asymmetry between seeders and ESFs managers has always been
the key factor holding back the development of hedge fund seeding business, especially
in the aftermath of 2008 financial crisis. Therefore, an insurer has been firstly intro-
duced in our paper with the aim to improve ESFs managers credibility and thus solve
the problem of information asymmetry between seeders and ESFs managers.
Similar to Tang and Yang (2017), we focus only the information asymmetry between
seeders and ESFs managers, and simply assume no such information asymmetry be-
tween ESFs managers and insurers. This assumption is based on the following reasons:
First, insurers might act as hedge funds long-term strategic partners, thus have more
insider knowledges than seeders; Second, insurers are more professional in terms of
monitoring risks, thus know well of ESFs managers’ credit level or default risks.
Inspired by SMEs’ experience of overcoming borrowing constraints in China as
discussed in Yang and Zhang (2013) and Tang and Yang (2017) among others, finan-
cial constraint results from information asymmetry faced by ESFs managers could
be largely alleviated by introducing the fees-for-guarantee swap supported by a com-
mercial guarantee-company or an insurer. Unlike the traditional credit scheme, ESFs
managers in our innovative setting pay guarantee company or insurer a certain portion
of her fees, as guarantee costs instead of regular fees. Once the hedge fund is liqui-
dated either exogenously by a crisis shock or endogenously by investors, the seeder
will receive compensatory payment from the insurer. Indeed the seeder participated
in the fees-for-guarantee swap obtains portfolio insurance, thus her return distribu-
tion has been altered such that her downside risks is well controlled while allowing
participation of upside potential gains.
Nevertheless a rule of thumb in designing seed arrangements and a few simple
models featuring hedge fund seeding return have been proof popular in practice, the
theoretical research on the contract costs and optimal designing of these contracts
is quite limited.4 Under the Black-Scholes framework, we have derived closed-form
solutions for seed costs and guarantee costs as well. Moreover, we develop a numerical
2Hedge fund managers normally receive 20% of the increase in fund value in excess of the last recorded
maximum, i.e. high-water-mark ( HWM, henceforth) as incentive fees in addition to 2% of the asset under
management (AUM) as management fees, which “two-twenty” viewed as the industry’s norm. Several academic
articles study the characteristics of hedge fund fees, such as Fung and Hsieh (1997), Fung and Hsieh (1999)),
and Aragon and Nanda (2012), as well as several articles in the Wall Street Journal.
3Based on the Consumption-CAPM framework, Ewald and Zhang (2016) provides strong evidences for the
benefits of fees-for-seed swaps.
4For example, Larch Lane Advisors (LLC) has constructed a simple model to project returns and cash flows
for a seeded fund, featuring the innovative seeding strategy. Ewald and Zhang (2016) provide first theoretical
research for these problems under the seeding stage, but they only consider the fees-for-seed swap without
insurance.
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procedure to analyse impact of managerial ownership, fund liquidation on the risk
shifting behaviour of ESFs managers with a convex payoff compensation structure.
This paper is closely related to Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003), which pro-
vides the first quantitative intertemporal valuation framework of investors’ payoff and
managers’ fees in a setting where the fund’s value follows a log-normal process and
the fund managers have no discretion over the choice of portfolio. However, our paper
mainly focuses on the innovation of hedge fund seeding business like fees-for-seed and
fees-for-guarantee swaps. Moreover, we provide a dynamic framework for valuing the
costs of these swaps, as well as modelling the impact of HWM, managerial ownership
and fund liquidation on ESFs managers’ risk shifting behaviour, at the hedge fund
seeding stage.
An companion paper by Ewald and Zhang (2016) has done a similar research on
the hedge fund seeding businesses. With a strong focus on the effect of frictions of
incomplete markets, such as idiosyncratic risks, Ewald and Zhang (2016) provides a
dynamic valuation model of the hedge fund seeding business, by solving the consump-
tion and portfolio-choice problem for a risk-averse manager, who launches a hedge fund
via a seeding vehicle. Unlike Ewald and Zhang (2016) which spotlights the idiosyn-
cratic risks of seeding business, we focus on the borne information asymmetry between
seeders and ESFs managers. A new financial contract, we refer to fees-for-guarantee
swap, has been introduced in our paper with the aim of solving this problem. Another
dramatic difference between Ewald and Zhang (2016) and our paper is the risk profiles
regarding to seeders’ investment. Thanks to the fees-for-guarantee swap, the seeder’s
investment downside risks in our paper has been well under control when the fund
defaults, whereas in Ewald and Zhang (2016) the seeder could lost every penny in-
vested in the fund. Finally, both papers show that ordinary investors are more willing
to invest in an ESFs backed up by seeders with innovative contracts. However, the
mechanisms under are quite different: Ewald and Zhang (2016) argue that ordinary
investors get incentives and benefit from their senior positions at the “waterfall” struc-
ture, while here in our framework interests between ordinary investors and the ESFs
manager are well aligned as the manager has skin in the game.
Yang and Zhang (2013) provide a formal study on equity-for-guarantee swap on
SMEs’ financing problems, which share some similarities for those of ESFs managers.
Following this, the financial constraint faced by ESFs managers could be largely solved
by introducing fees-for-guarantee swaps in hedge funds. Moreover, our model focuses
on the impacts of fees-for-guarantee swaps on ESFs manager’s risk shifting behaviour
and highlights hedge fund risk management at the hedge fund seeding stage.
This current paper also relates to some general portfolio insurance literature. Along
the lines of Leland and Rubinstein (1976) and Basak (2002)amongst other studies ,
Ho et al. (2010) provide a general review of of portfolio insurance strategies, claiming
that portfolio insurance is a dynamic hedging process that allows market participants
to alter the return distribution such that the downside risk is well controlled while
allowing participation on the upside gains. The seeder’s return distribution in our
framework indeed has been changed due to the fees-for-guarantee swap. Unlike specific
popular PI methods in practice, e.g. Option Based Portfolio Insurance (OBPI) that is
firstly introduced by Leland and Rubinstein (1976), and Constant Proportion Portfolio
Insurance (CPPI) by Black and Jones (1987) among others, the PI obtained by the
seeder here is provided by a third party, an insurance company, other than the dynamic
hedging by the seeder herself. Another interesting feature in our model is that portfolio
insurance will be terminated at random liquidation point. As the seeder only seeks to
insure the fund’s default risk. Moreover, what we are mostly interested in this current
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paper is the outcome profile of portfolio insurance provided by the insurer, not specific
PI strategies that might be adopted by the insurer for risk hedging purpose.
Our article is closely related to the substantial literature that examine the effects
of convex payoff compensation on the risk choices of hedge fund managers.5 Carpen-
ter (2000) asserts that it is optimal for hedge fund managers, who faces no explicit
downside risk, to choose infinite volatility as asset value goes to zero. On the con-
trary, managers should reduce the volatility to ensure that liquidation does not occur.
Similarly, Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007) and Aragon and Nanda (2012) argue
that the convex payoff structure of a manager does not necessarily induce risk shifting
when fund undertakes poor performance, as long as she is exposed to downside risk, ei-
ther through her ownership of fund share or her management fees. Aragon and Nanda
(2012) empirically analyse the relationship between risk shifting by a hedge fund man-
ager and the manager’s incentive contract, personal capital stake, and the risk of fund
closure. Other related empirical research include the work of Agarwal, Daniel and
Naik (2009) and Agarwal, Daniel and Naik (2011). We are unaware, however, of any
existing model that both captures the managerial skill (alpha) and the convex com-
pensation at the hedge fund seeding business. Capturing these institutional features
in a model that is sufficiently tractable to evaluate the costs of these innovative swaps
in the hedge fund seeding business is a main contribution of this study.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we develop two models
of hedge fund seeding innovations and analyse the impact of incentive contracts, man-
agerial stake, and hedge fund liquidation on managers’ risk shifting behaviour. Illusive
numerical results of our theoretical model are provided in section 3 to shed more in-
sights of the hedge fund seeding business. Finally, section 4 concludes. The appendix
collects the equilibrium prices of contingent claims, such as management and incentive
fees as well as investors’ payoff.
2. Modeling hedge fund seeding innovation
In this section, we first present a benchmark model discussing hedge funds dynamics
with fees-for-seed swap only. A dynamic framework of hedge fund seeding has been set
up latter, including both fees-for-seed swaps and fees-for-guarantee swaps. Lastly, we
look into the breakeven alpha strategy, and we show that, with the help of it, ordinary
investors are more willing to invest in a ESFs backed up by seeding investments.
2.1. Hedge fund dynamics and valuation
2.1.1. Dynamics of the asset under management
We assume the cumulative-return process R of the diversified market portfolio satisfies
dRt = µMdt+ σMdBt, t ≥ 0, (1)
where µM and σM > 0 are constants. We denote by S the value process of the asset
under management (AUM, henceforth) and by H the current HWM, which is the
highest level that the AUM has reached subject to certain adjustments. We assume
5See, for example, Ross (2004), Panageas and Westerfield (2009) Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) and Lan,
Wang and Yang (2013) among others.
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for t ≥ 0 that
dSt
St
= (µ− δ − c)dt+ ρσdBt +
√
1− ρ2σdZt, S0 given, St < Ht, (2)
where δ is the regular withdrawal rate, c is the management fee rate, and ρ ∈ [−1, 1]
is the correlation coefficient between the hedge fund and the market.
2.1.2. Management compensation contracts
In hedge funds industry, ESFs managers are commonly compensated via both man-
agement fees which is specified as a constant fraction c of AUM and incentive fees
accompanied by a HWM provision. The HWM process, denoted by H, evolves deter-
ministically if it is higher than AUM according to
dHt = (g − δ − c′)Htdt, (3)
where g is the rate of interest or an other contractually stated rate and c′ is the cost
or fees allocated to its reduction. If AUM reaches a new high, the HWM is reset to
this higher level.
2.1.3. Hedge fund liquidation
Following Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003), the fund will be liquidated with an
exogenously given probability λ per unit of time. Such liquidation time is donated by
τ1. In addition, an endogenous liquidation required by ordinary investors may occur if
the fund performance is sufficiently poor. Similar to Grossman and Zhou (1993) and
Lan, Wang and Yang (2013) among others, who assume the liquidation threshold is
lHt, ours is a lower value of b ≡ l(1− φ)Ht, where φ is the fraction of AUM owned by
the managers. This is because ESFs managers owns φ portion of the fund while the
outside investors have the remains, thus the liquidation barrier triggered by outside
investors would be φ percent lower in our setting. The hitting time of the endogenous
liquidation threshold is denoted by τ2. Therefore, we can define the liquidation time
as τ ≡ min {τ1, τ2}
Unlike the existing literature, our model assumes a lower liquidation boundary, due
to the managers’ ownership of AUM under the arrangement of the innovative contract.
In view of this, the new financing scheme of hedge fund generates more profits and
leads to a significant welfare improvement.6
2.1.4. The pricing of fees and investors’ claim
We first denote by η ≡ (µM − r)/σM the Sharpe ratio of the market. Following
Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003), we define α ≡ µ− r−β(µM − r) ≡ µ− r−ρση
6A number of independent studies have concluded that on average, ESFs outperform more established funds
as being either smaller and nimbler, or hungrier for returns. Hedge Fund Research (HFR) found that over the
10-year period from 1994 to 2004, funds with less than a three-year track record outperformed older funds
by over 5% annually, with nearly identical volatility. Similarly, a 2009 study by PerTrac Financial Solutions
finds that younger and smaller funds have outperformed larger and older funds, over the long term. Other
studies, Aiken, Clifford and Ellis (2013) and Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) made a number of adjustments to
raw performance data, to mitigate survivorship or backfill biases. Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) reached the
conclusion that managers generate abnormal (excess) performance of 2.3% during their first two years relative
to later years.
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as the premium return of ESFs, which is considered as an excess return generated by
managerial skills. The risk-adjusted expected growth of the hedge fund under Q is
then given by ν ≡ µ− ρση = α+ r. Accordingly, the net asset value of the hedge fund
follows
dSt
St
= (α+ r − δ − c)dt+ ρσdBQt + dZt, St < Ht, (4)
where Z and BQ defined by BQt ≡ Bt + ηt are Q−Brownian motion. Therefore, at
any current time t ≥ 0, according to (4), we get the present values of annual fee, the
performance fee and the investors’ claim respectively as follows:
A(St, Ht) = EQt
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)cSsds
]
, (5)
P (St, Ht) = EQt
{∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)k[dHs − (g − δ − c′)Hsds]
}
, (6)
I(St, Ht) = EQt
[∫ τ
t
e−r(s−t)δSds+ e−r(τ−t)Sτ
]
. (7)
Thus, the value of the total management fees is given by
F (St, Ht) ≡ A(St, Ht) + P (St, Ht). (8)
The value of all these contingent claims could be explicitly derived, please refer to the
Appendix A for computation details.
2.2. A benchmark model of hedge fund seeding innovation
In order to reach the initial AUM target and cover organizational expenses, ESFs
managers usually seek help from seeders by swapping part of their fees for seed capi-
tal. Under the arrangement of the fees-for-seed swap, the ESFs manager receives the
amount φS0 of seed capital at the cost of ψ of her total fees. Thus, the manager’s total
compensation denoted by MV (St, Ht) is given by
MV (St, Ht) = (1− ψ)F (St, Ht) + φI(St, Ht), (9)
where the total fees F (St, Ht) and the investor payoff I(St, Ht) are defined in Equations
(A.11) and (A.13) respectively.
Similar to Ewald and Zhang (2016) that the seed capital provided by the seeder
must be equal to equilibrium value of the fees allocated to the seeder, thus the swap
ratio, denoted by ψ, is determined by
ψF (S0, S0) = φS0, (10)
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where the annual fee F (S0, S0) is defined in Equation (A.11)
7. After rearranging the
above equation, the fraction ψ, referred to as seed cost in the following text, is given
by
ψ=
φ(χ+ c){θ2(1 + k)− 1− bθ¯[θ1(1 + k)− 1]}
c{θ2(1+k)−1−bθ¯[θ1(1+k)−1]}+(1− bθ¯)χk+θ¯(1 + k)cb1−θ1
, (11)
where θ¯ ≡ θ2 − θ1, and χ ≡ δ + λ − α, θ1 and θ2 are respectively the smaller and
larger roots of a characteristic quadratic equation defined in Appendix A.
The seed cost in practice is determined via the rule of thumb; however, it is en-
dogenously derived in our model. Interestingly, the relationship between fees-for-seed
ratio and seed capital is linear when there is no exogenous liquidation risk (l = 0)8,
which is quite similar to the rule of thumb. Clearly, the realistic value SV (St, Ht) of
the seeder’s claim is given by
SV (St, Ht) = ψF (St, Ht). (12)
Finally, the total present value of hedge fund HFV (St, Ht) is the sum of the managerial
compensation, the seeder’s and ordinary investors’ claim, i.e.
HFV (St, Ht) ≡ MV (St, Ht) + SV (St, Ht) + (1− φ)I(St, Ht),
= F (St, Ht) + I(St, Ht),
(13)
which is similar to Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003) but has a quite different
asset structure.
2.3. Hedge fund seeding innovation with both fees-for-seed swap and
fees-for-guarantee swap
To alleviate financial constraint of ESFs managers, hereafter we introduce a fees-
for-guarantee swap in our model, which specifies that the ESFs manager gives up the
fraction ϕ of her fees to get the seeder’s payoff insured. Once the hedge fund liquidates,
an insurer, instead of the manager, must pay the amount φS0 of cash to the seeder. As
a return for the guarantee, the insurer gets a fraction, denoted by ϕ, of the manager’s
fees.9
Obviously, seeders are exposed to limited risks due to the fees-for-guarantee swap.
Therefore seeders have stronger incentives to invest in the fund. Manager’s compen-
sation under the innovative guarantee scheme, i.e. MV (St, Ht), is
MV (St, Ht) = (1− ψ¯ − ϕ)F (St, Ht) + φI(St, Ht),
= (1− ψ¯ − ϕ− φ)F (St, Ht) + φHFV (St, Ht), (14)
7Unlike the fees structure G in Ewald and Zhang (2016), the fees F in our model is the same part F as in
Equation (20 in Ewald and Zhang (2016) or Equation (11a) in Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003). As Ewald
and Zhang (2016) focus on the lock-up period of seeding businesses, their fees structure G in Equation (18)
includes both the management fees and performances during the lock-up period and afterwards, thus the seed
costs ratio can be calculated numerically instead of a close-formed solution. While here we place our emphasis
on fees-for-guarantee swaps and consider only the afterwards with on idiosyncratic risks Goetzmann, Ingersoll
and Ross (2003).
8One can obtain the results easily by substituting l = 0 into Equation (11).
9 Unlike the normal credit scheme, however, the hedge fund manager in the new credit guarantee scheme
must pay to the guarantee company a portion (ϕ) of her fees(including both management fees and incentive
fees) as guarantee costs instead of the regular guarantee fees.
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where HFV (St, Ht) is the total fund’s value.In the above equation, we notice that the
manager gives up ϕF (St, Ht) to an insurer in the new setting. Naturally, the value
GV (St, Ht) of the insurer’s claim is
GV (St, Ht) = ϕF (St, Ht). (15)
In general, an insurer will diversify her risk by signing many contracts with different
hedge funds. Thus, the idiosyncratic risk of a hedge fund taken on by the insurer
will be well-diversified and the present value of insurer’s compensatory payment Vguar
should equal the market value of fees allocated to the insurer when the swap is signed,
i.e.
Vguar ≡ GV (S0, S0). (16)
At fund liquidation, the seeder claims her initial seed capital φS0 from the insurer. In
equilibrium, the insurer’s payoff from the swap should equal to her guarantee liability,
which is
Vguar ≡ pb(b, s0)φS0, (17)
where pb(b, s0), the market value of a security that claims one unit of account at the
hitting time τ(b) = inf{t ≥ 0 : st ≤ b}, is given by 10
pb(b, s0) =
(s0
b
)θ1.
. (18)
Now we can easily compute the guarantee cost, ϕ, by submitting Equations (16)
and (17) into Equation (15):
ϕ =
pb(b, s0)φS0
F (S0, S0)
= pb(b, s0)ψ. (19)
Then we define the value of seeder’s return SV (St, Ht) by:
SV (St, Ht) = ψ¯F (St, Ht) + pb(b, s)φS0, (20)
where ψ¯ is the seed cost under the new setting. According to the equilibrium asset
pricing theory, the seeder’s payoff SV (S0, H0) from the seeding deal should equal to
the seed capital provided when signing the contract, i.e.,
SV (S0, H0) ≡ φS0. (21)
10One can find the computational details in Duffie (2001). Similar to Wang, Wang and Yang (2012) and Song,
Yang and Yang (2013) among others, we denote s as AUM/HWM ratio, i.e. s = S/H, an effective variable in
our model that is given by
dst
st
= (α+ r − δ − c)dt+ ρσdBt + dZt, st < 1.
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Thus the seeding cost in this new setting, denoted by ψ¯, is given by
ψ¯ = (1− pb(b, s0))φS0/F (S0, S0),
= (1− pb(b, s0))ψ. (22)
Unlike the case that seeder’s value could be as low as zero in Ewald and Zhang
(2016) as well as our benchmark model, here the seeder’s payoff is well protected. By
comparing Equation (12) and (20), we find that the seeder’s payoff in the guarantee
scheme faces less risk at liquidation with a guranteed paymetns of φS0 instead of zero.
After submitting Equation (22) and (19) into Equation (14) we have the manager’s
payoff as
MV (S0, S0) = (1− ψ)F (S0, s0) + φI(S0, s0). (23)
The manager’s value here with fees-for-guarantee swap is exactly the same as in Equa-
tion (9) under the benchmark model when the contract commences, which means that
the manager transfers ϕ ≡ pb(b, s0)ψ percent fees from the seeder to the insurer and
pays no extras under guarantee framework.
Finally, the total present value of hedge fundHFV (St, Ht), i.e. the sum of managerial
compensation, the seeder’s payoff and ordinary investors’ value, is given by:
HFV (St, Ht) ≡ MV (St, Ht) + SV (St, Ht) + (1− φ)I(St, Ht),
= F (St, Ht) + I(St, Ht),
(24)
which is the same as in (13). As in our model the fund performance has been exoge-
nously determined by the alpha strategy only, the guarantee mechanism here has not
contributed to the performance. Instead, it forces the ESFs manager to put aside part
of her earnings to refund the seeder’s initial investment once the fund defaults.
2.4. Breakeven alpha strategy
An extremely important question for investors is: what is the minimum α to be de-
livered by the manager to justify the carried interest (k), or for ordinary investors to
break even ( I(S, S) = S) ? Identically, how large a performance fee should be charged
for a given level of performance. Using Equation (A.13) to solve I(S, S) = S for k
gives the maximum high water performance fee justified by a particular α:
k∗(α) =
1− θ2 + θ¯b1−θ1 + (θ1 − 1)bθ¯
θ2 − θ1bθ¯ − θ¯b1−θ1 − (δ + λ)(1− bθ¯)/(α− c)
. (25)
Equation (25) is quite similar to Equation (18) in Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross
(2003), however, they are different in terms of liquidation thresholds, as ours is φ
percent lower due to the managerial ownership. Theoretically, k∗, in Equation (25),
could be as low as zero or even negative.This means that the investors will not willing to
enter the contract even for a positive performance α.This is because a smaller positive α
may only justify management fees (c = 150 base points here in our model) compensated
to ESFs managers but not enough for both the management fees and performance fees.
This is further consistent with Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003) that “hedge funds
may well charge less ... Then, managers might be earning (management) fees only just
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sufficient to draw them into the business.” Other than the breakeven alpha strategy
case, in practice investors either make losses or collect surplus depending on whether
they hire a more skilled manager than the breakeven case or not. Therefore, it is quite
essential for investors to access managers’ skill correctly.
3. Quantitative Results
To develop more intuitive understanding of our theoretical findings, here we present
numerical analyzes on the impact of HWM, managerial stake, and the possibility
of fund liquidation on ESFs managers’ risk shifting behaviour under the innovative
scheme with the fees-for-guarantee swaps. In order to make a comparison, following
Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003), our numerical results are based on the following
annualized baseline parameter values: typical parameter values r+ c′− g = 5 percent,
k = 20 percent, c = 1.5 percent, δ + λ = 10 percent, fund volatility σ = 20 percent,
alpha skills α = 5 percent, and liquidation barrier l = 0.5, managerial stake φ = 10
percent thus the effective liquidation barrier b ≡ l(1− φ) = 0.45.
3.1. The seeder’s payoff and contract designing of fees-for-seed ratio
3.1.1. Seeders’ return profile with and without fees-for-guarantee swap
Here we present more insights on how fees-for-guarantee swap helps seeders control
their downside risk. Seeders’ payoff with both guarantee and fees-for-seed swap is
much less volatile compared with the case for fees-for-seed swap only. As discussed
in Section 2, seeders’ return profile is guaranteed at prefixed level (usually equals to
her initial investment) once fund liquidation occurs, thus the liquidation risks is well
under control with guarantee.
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Figure 1. The impact of fund performance S/H,
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The seeder’s value in Ewald and Zhang (2016) as well as in our benchmark model
shows the great profit potential once the funds performs well, however, the seeder might
loss all her investment once the fund defaults. In contract, the seeder’s payoff in our
framework with guarantee is well protected and redeems initial investment when the
fund is liquidated. More specifically, the seeder’s payoff in Figure1 without guarantee
is an increasing function of fund performance but a decreasing function of fund risks.
However, Figure 2 shows that seeders’ return is an increasing function of fund risks
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and a more complex function of performance. More specifically, the seeder’s payoff gets
worse for even a better performance of the hedge fund with significantly high risk. At
first glimpse it seems beyond belief, however, the reason is quite simple that extremely
high level of risk outweighs the benefit from the fund’s performance. Therefore, the
seeder prefers a liquidation to redeem her investment than keeping investing in a fund
with poor performance.
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Figure 3. The impact of managerial stake φ on the
initial designing of fees-for-seed swap ratio ψ with
three different liquidation barriers. In this case, we
choose a higher volatility (σ = 30%) in order to
highlight the liquidation effect.
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Figure 4. The impact of managerial stake φ on the
initial designing of fees-for-seed swap ratio ψ with
three different levels of manager skills. Similar to
Fig.3, fund volatilityσ is 30%.
3.1.2. Contract designing: fees-for-seed ratio
As Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003) states,“In particular, if investment capital
is a scarce resource relative to potential hedge fund managers, virtually all benefits
of the hedge funds may go to investors ”. Our numerical results back up the above
statements: to highlights the difference, we consider a extreme case that a manager
with lower alpha skills (α = −5%) has to give up 85% fees to a seeder in exchange
for 15% fund’s ownership, while a much more skilled manager (α = 5%) gives up
only 35% of her fees, as indicated in Figure 4. This is also consistent with Ewald and
Zhang (2016) that “the seeder demands more fund revenue share ...and the difference
(between good and bad performance managers) can be up to 40%”. Both Figure 3 and
Figure 4 indicate that a manager has to give up a larger fraction of her performance
fees to exchange a greater amount of seed capital, as expected. Interestingly, most
of our numerical results from Figure 3 and Figure 4 reveal nonlinear relationships
between the fees-for-seed ration and managerial stake except for ESFs managers who
face no endogenous liquidation risks (i.e. l = 0). The rationale is that managerial stake
has nonlinear effects of ψ in our model through affecting the liquidation barrier and
these effects disappear once the liquidation l is zero.
3.2. The insurer’s claim, i.e. guarantee costs ϕ
Generally speaking, an insurer will diversify idiosyncratic risks by signing a great many
of contracts with different ESFs managers with various types of invest strategies. Thus,
it is reasonable to assume that insurers only bear systematic risks and the idiosyncratic
risks of hedge funds will be well-diversified. Figure 5 shows the guarantee costs boosts,
as expected, as the increase of fund risks. Moreover, the better performance the fund
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delivers, the smaller guarantee cost the manager faces. These observations are consis-
tent with economic intuition since a manager with better skills generates more fees and
profits. More specifically, as the fund risk increases from 10% to 30%, the guarantee
costs rises up slowly form naught to 5% for a better performance of α = 5%, while it
rises dramatically from 4% to 26% for a poor performance of α = −5%.
In addition, we present illusive results of the effect of liquidation barrier on guarantee
costs. Figure 6 shows that given a higher level of fund risk, such as 30%, the guarantee
costs for a higher liquidation barrier ESFs fund at l = 0.8% is around 45 percent.
By contrast, the ESFs fund with a lower barrier at l = 0.5% costs only 5 percent of
fees. This is obvious as a higher liquidation barrier indicates greater liquidation risks,
thus larger guarantee costs demanded by the insurer. Interestingly, as the ESFs fund
volatility decreases, this gap becomes smaller, and finally disappears. If there is no
liquidation barrier, then no guarantee scheme would be necessary as the fund has no
liquidation risks, which is a case against reality.
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Figure 5. The impact of fund risk σ on the value
of guarantee costs ϕ with three different values of
alpha skills.
0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
G
ua
ra
nt
ee
 c
os
ts
l=0
l=0.5
l=0.8
Figure 6. The impact of fund risk σ on the value
of guarantee costs ϕ with three different values of
liquidation barrier.
3.3. Risk shifting behaviour of ESFs managers at the stage hedge fund
seeding
3.3.1. The effect of liquidation barrier
Similar to Carpenter (2000), it is optimal for ESFs managers who is compensated
through an asymmetric bonus fee and faces no explicit downside risks to take extreme
risks when she is further away from the money.
The risk shifting behaviour for ESFs managers has been illustrated in Figure 7: as
the total compensation value of the ESFs manager is always an increasing function of
fund volatility, which means the ESFs manager has great incentive to shift risk. By
contrast, risk shifting behaviour has been largely cubed once the ESFs manager faces
explicit downside risk, as is shown in Figure 8. This result is generally consistent with
Hodder and Jackwerth (2007), Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007) and Aragon and
Nanda (2012). Given the existence of downside liquidation risks, ESFs managers face
tradeoff between the potential gain from the performance fees and loss from manage-
ment fees and her fund ownership as well when shifting risks. For a ESFs manager
with a higher liquidation barrier, the negative effect from losses of management fees
and her ownership outweighs the risk shifting benefits from beating the HWM (or
performance fees), thus risk shifting behaviour is a suboptimal strategy as it leads to
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less compensation for the ESFs manager.
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fund volatility σ on the value of the ESFs manager’s
total compensation. In this case the manager’s own-
ership is φ = 10%.
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Figure 10. The impact of fund performance S/H,
fund volatility σ on the value of the ESFs manager’s
total compensation. In this case the manager’s own-
ership is φ = 0%.
Our model suggests that optimal contract designing not only moderates risk shifting
following poor performance, but also encourages profit chasing. As is illustrated in
Figure 9, the manager will choose lower volatility in order to dramatically reduce the
chance of hitting the liquidation boundary. However, increasing risk slightly could be
optimal once the AUM is near its HWM. The intuition is quite simple: the manager
will take gambles to collect the huge profits once AUM reaches the HWM.
3.3.2. The effect of managerial stakes
Generally speaking, an ESFs manager will not take great gambles following poor fund
performance when having their own investment in the fund (See e.g. Carpenter (2000),
Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), Hodder and Jackwerth (2007) and Aragon and
Nanda (2012) among others.). Our numerical results show that the managerial stake
is effective in moderating the ESFs manager’s incentive to shift risk when the fund is
likely to liquidate endogenously.
As Figure 10 shows: when the current AUM is near the liquidation barrier (x →
0.5), ESFs managers without fund ownership experience a relatively small increase of
total compensation value of 6.5% (from around 3.5% to 10%) if she reduces the fund
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volatility from 30% to 10%. On the contrary, the ESFs manager’s total compensation
value increases 18% (from around 15.7% to 33.9%). The illusive results show that
the manager who has her own investment in the fund in will largely improve her
welfare when AUM near the initial liquidation barrier (l = 0.5) by decreasing the fund
volatility dramatically, thus mitigating the manager’s risk shifting behaviour.
3.4. The breakeven α strategy
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Figure 11. The maximum performance fee k rate
for different managerial skills α with three levels of
fund volatility.
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Figure 12. The sensitivity of the maximum per-
formance fee k rate for different managerial skills α
with three different levels of liquidation barrier.
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Figure 13. The sensitivity of the maximum performance fee k rate for different managerial skills α with
three different levels of seeding investment.
Finally, we provide numerical evidence showing why α is important both for man-
agers and investors. As we can see from both Figure 11 and Figure 12, ESFs managers
should deliver better fund performance to justify a higher performance fee, which is
consistent with Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003). More specifically, Figure 11
indicates that the minimum α required for three different volatility (σ = 10%, 20%
and 30%) to justify a performance fee rate (e.g. the most usual case i.e. k = 20%) is
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270 and 330 and 450 basis points respectively. Now we turn to the effects of exogenous
liquidation barrier on the maximal performance fee rate justified. Given k = 20%, the
excess return (α) demanded is 390 and 450 basis points respectively for two different
liquidation barrier (l = 0, 0.5). The intuition is simple, a lower liquidation barrier con-
tributes to higher values for investors, thus a smaller alpha is required. Interestingly,
our numerical results reveal that charging a positive performance fee is never justified
for an ESFs manager who generates a α less than 150 basis points regardless of differ-
ent level of fund risks and liquidation barriers. As hedge funds commonly charge both
management fees and performance fees, poor performed funds (α ≤150 base points)
may only sufficient to cover management fees but the performance fees.
Figure 13 presents the effects of managerial ownerships on breakeven alphas. In
general, the breakeven alpla requested by investors decreases as managerial ownership
increases, other things equal. For instance, for a given fees structure (c = 1.5% &K =
20%) the breakeven alpha drops from 4.75% to 4.2% as the ESFs manager increases
her fund ownership from zero to 20%. This results are in agreeable with Ewald and
Zhang (2016)’s findings that “ ordinary investors are more willing to invest in an ESFs
backed up by seeders via fees-for-seed swap”. However, the mechanisms under are
quite different: Ewald and Zhang (2016) argue that ordinary investors get incentives
and benefit from their senior positions at the “waterfall” structure, while here in our
framework interests between ordinary investors and the ESFs manager are well aligned
as managers have skin in the game.
4. Conclusion
This paper studies the pricing of seeding and guarantee costs as well as analyzes the
risk shifting behaviour of an ESFs manager under Black-Scholes framework. Innova-
tive contracts, here we refer as fees-for-guarantee swap and fees-for-seed swap, have
been introduced in this paper to improve managers credibility resulting from severe
information asymmetry between seeders and ESFs managers. The main conclusions
are detailed explicitly while some numerical examples are provided for illustrations as
well.
We find that seeders in our innovative scheme bear less risks than those in practice
who only sign fees-for-seed swaps at the seeding stage. This intuition is straightforward
as the seeder in our setting still redeems her initial investment from the insurer at
the fund liquidation point. These innovative swaps also ensure that interests among
seeders, insurers, and ESFs managers are effectively aligned.
Closed-form solution of fees-for-seed ratio has been derived in our model instead of a
rule of thumb in reality. We also provide detailed numerical analysis for more insights.
The larger the amount of seed capital obtained, the more fees ESFs managers have
to give up, as we expect. Interestingly, most of our quantitative results (except the
case of no liquidation risks) reveal a nonlinear relationship between the fees-for-seed
ratio and managerial stake, which is quite different from the ”thumb rule” in practice.
Our findings show that when AUM is close to its liquidation barrier, the guarantee
costs rises as the increase of fund risks. As a higher level of fund volatility leads to a
greater probability of compensatory payment to be paid by an insurer, by whom thus
a greater guarantee costs is demanded.
Interestingly, our numerical findings reveal that charging a positive performance fee
is never justified for an ESFs manager who has poor fund performances with an α
less than 150 basis points regardless of the fund risk levels and liquidation barriers.
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Other than the breakeven alpha strategy case, it is not uncommon that investors either
make losses or collect surplus depending on whether they hire a more skilled manager
than the breakeven case or not. Therefore, it is quite essential for investors to access
managers’ skill correctly.
Finally, our model suggests that optimal contract designing, i.e. the determination
of swap ratios e.g. ψ and ϕ could not only moderate risk shifting following poor per-
formance, but also give managers incentive to chasing profits. For example, numerical
results show that managerial stake is an effective tool in terms of moderating the ESFs
manager’s incentive to shift risk when her fund bears liquidation risks.
Several opportunities exist for future research. On the one hand, dynamic leverage
can be incorporated into our model to further analyse ESFs managers’ risk shifting
behaviour, inspired by Lan, Wang and Yang (2013). On the other hand, we can extend
our model to capture the risk-averse magnitude of both ESFs managers and investors,
see Sorensen, Wang and Yang (2014), Wang, Wang and Yang (2012) among others.
Motivated by recent portfolio insurance literature, see Cont and Tankov (2009) and
Zieling et al. (2014) for example, it would also be interesting to analyse the most
effective PI approaches the insurer could adopt to hedge the risks embedded in the
hedge fund seeding business.
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Appendix A. Pricing a hedge fund
In this appendix, we provide details of computing equilibrium values of contingent
claims associated with a hedge fund.
In order to derive the equilibrium value of fees and investor claim (Equations (5)
to (7)) defined in Section (2.1), two boundary conditions are required. The first one
indicates that once the asset value falls to the liquidation level, S(Ht), then investors
will withdraw all his money from the hedge fund and there are no further costs or fees
generated.
A(S(Ht), Ht) = 0, P (S(Ht), Ht) = 0, I(S(Ht), Ht) = S(Ht), (A.1)
whereS(Ht) = lHt.
The other one applies along with the boundary St = Ht. The HWM is reset to
Ht + ε, while the net asset value excess the HWM to Ht + ε and then the manager
obtain a performance fee of kε, reducing the asset value to Ht + ε(1− k). So, we have
P (Ht + ε,Ht)− P (Ht + ε− kε,Ht) = kε, (A.2)
In the limit, as ε→ 0, and using Taylor’s expansion rule, giving the second boundary
condition
kPS(Ht, Ht) = k + PH(Ht, Ht), (A.3)
and boundary conditions for the management fees and the investor’s claim are given
by
kAS(Ht, Ht) = AH(Ht, Ht), kIS(Ht, Ht) = IH(Ht, Ht). (A.4)
According to the dynamic asset pricing theory (Duffie (2001)), one can derive the
following equilibrium price
V f (St, Ht) = EQ
[∫ τ
t
exp (−r(s− t)) f(ys)ds |St = S0, Ht = H0
]
, (A.5)
for any contingent claim underlying AUM (St) and HWM(Ht) with a payment flow
f(St, Ht) to the claimant. If f(·) is a linear function, V f (y) can be determined by
solving the integral directly. Similar to Goetzmann, Ingersoll and Ross (2003), the
value function is time independent, i.e. V ft = 0. Thus, the function V
f (y) satisfies the
following ODE from Ito’s formula
(α+ r− δ− c)SV fS +
1
2
σ2S2V fSS + (g− δ− c′)HV fH +λ(f(M)−V f )− rV f = 0. (A.6)
One can identify the solution of function V f (St, Ht) by specifying the general solu-
tion of the homogeneous ODE with boundary conditions defined in Equations (A.1),
(A.3) and (A.4).
Further, it is clear by the economics of the problem that V f is homogeneous of degree
one in S and H, so the solution has the form V f (St, Ht) = HtG(s). Substituting this
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and its derivatives into Equation (A.6) gives an ODE
1
2
σ2x2Gss + (α+ r + c
′ − g − c)sGs − (r + c′ − g + δ + λ)G+ γs = 0, (A.7)
where γ = 0 for f = P , γ = c for f = A or f = F , and γ = δ + λ for f = I.
The solution to Equation (A.7) is given by
G(s) =
γs
c+ δ + λ− α +As
θ1 +Bsθ2 , (A.8)
where A and B are constants of integration and the two real roots, denoted by θ1 and
θ2 solve the following quadratic equation:
1
2
σ2θ(θ − 1) + (α+ r + c′ − c− g)θ − (r + c′ − g + δ + λ) = 0. (A.9)
Solving the above equation and with the no bubble conditions c + δ + λ ≥ α easily
gives
θ1,2 =
−($ − σ2/2)∓√($ − σ2/2)2 + 2σ2($ +m− α+ δ + λ)
σ2
, (A.10)
where$ ≡ α+ r + c′ −m− g obviously θ1 < 1 < θ2.
Therefore the equilibrium value of the total fees, performance fee and the investor’s
claim are
F (St, Ht) =
c
c+δ+λ−αSt +
(δ+λ−α)k+[θ1(1+k)−1]cl1−θ1
(c+δ+λ−α){θ2(1+k)−1−lθ2−θ1 [θ1(1+k)−1]}Ht
1−θ2Stθ2
− lθ2−θ1 (δ+λ−α)k+[θ2(1+k)−1]cl1−θ1(c+δ+λ−α){θ2(1+k)−1−lθ2−θ1 [θ1(1+k)−1]}Ht1−θ1Stθ1 ,
(A.11)
P (St, Ht) = k
Ht
1−θ2Stθ2 − lθ2−θ1Ht1−θ1Stθ1
θ2(1 + k)− 1− lθ2−θ1 [θ1(1 + k)− 1] , (A.12)
I(St, Ht) =
δ+λ
c+δ+λ−αSt − (δ+λ)k+[θ1(1+k)−1](c−α)l
1−θ1
(c+δ+λ−α){θ2(1+k)−1−lθ2−θ1 [θ1(1+k)−1]}Ht
1−θ2Stθ2
+ l
θ2−θ1 (δ+λ)k+[θ2(1+k)−1](c−α)l1−θ1
(c+δ+λ−α){θ2(1+k)−1−lθ2−θ1 [θ1(1+k)−1]}Ht
1−θ1Stθ1 .
(A.13)
Thus the management fees A(St, Ht) is given by
A(St, Ht) = F (St, Ht)− P (St, Ht). (A.14)
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